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JOHN MARSHALL: THE FORMATION OF A
JURIST
CHARLES HOBSON*
INTRODUCTION
Two hundred years ago, on February 4, 1801, John Marshall of
Virginia took the oath of office as the fourth Chief Justice of the
United States. He held this office until his death in July 1835,
when he was nearing eighty. Marshall presided over the
Supreme Court longer than any other Chief Justice. Under his
leadership, the Court began to acquire the power and play the
role in our constitutional system of government that we take for
granted today. We recognize the judiciary as one of three co-
equal branches of the government, along with the legislative and
executive. Yet, the notion of a balanced government of three co-
equal branches did not spring full-blown from the mind of the
framers of the Constitution in 1787. The framers expected the
federal judiciary, which they called "the least dangerous branch,"
to be a distant third behind Congress and the Presidency in
terms of power, importance, and prestige.I It is not inconceivable
that the Supreme Court would have remained a minor
appendage of our government, and our constitutional
development taken a distinctly different course, but for the fact
that John Marshall occupied the Chief Justice's chair during the
first three decades of the nineteenth century.
Adjunct Professor, College of William and Mary; Editor, Papers of John Marshall.
1 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 78 HAMILTON 464 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that "[it may truly be said [the judiciary] hafs] neither force nor win but merelyjudgment; and most ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments."); see also Forrest G. Alogna, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal
Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinction, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2001) (discussing
Alexander Hamilton's quotation). See generally DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE GROw'rH OF THE REPUBLIC 162 (Vail-Ballou Press Inc. 1949) (stating
that separate building for Supreme Court did not exist and they had to conduct their
business in basement of Capital).
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Marshall made the Supreme Court into a major player by
hitching its destiny to the Constitution itself. He appropriated
the Constitution as the judiciary's special preserve. He acted on
the assumption that the Constitution, besides being a framework
of our government, is also a law that judges must take into
account when deciding cases. He staked out and ultimately
established the judiciary's claim to expound and apply the law of
the Constitution in the same way that courts interpret common
law and statutes in their accustomed role of adjudicating legal
disputes. 2 On this disarming premise that the Constitution
operates in our courts just like any ordinary law, Marshall laid
the foundation for the judiciary's unanticipated rise to coordinate
status with the other branches of government. He asserted this
claim first and most famously in Marbury v. Madison,3 where he
stated that the Constitution was "a rule for the government of
courts, as well as of the legislature."4 As he framed the issue,
judges could not ignore the Constitution but were duty bound to
enforce it by disallowing laws repugnant to it.5
Chief Justice Marshall understood that the judiciary,
possessing neither power nor patronage, would always be the
weakest branch and that its effectiveness depended on gaining
the acquiescence of the legislative, executive, and ultimately, of
the people. Whatever power the Supreme Court enjoyed would
be a moral force based on its ability to persuade. In building up
the institutional strength of the judiciary, Marshall shrewdly
tapped the American people's undoubted reverence for the
2 See ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 195-96
(Princeton Univ. Press 1968) (explaining idea of constitution as fundamental law when
written that is analyzed according to common law principles); see also Charles W. Collier,
Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Hermeneutcs: Law as Interpretation, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 779, 807-09 (2000) (explaining Marshall's view of role of court in
interpreting Constitution). See generally FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL DEFENDER
OF THE CONSTITUTION 77-96 (Oscar Handlin ed., Little, Brown & Company 1981)
(explaining evolution of independent judiciary).
3 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4 Id. at 180.
5 See FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 202 (quoting Marshall at Virginia Ratifying
Convention:"[i]f [the government of the United States] were to make a law not warranted
by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement
of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as
coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void."); see also CHARLES F.
HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (Univ. of
Kan. Press 1996) (suggesting Marshall thought judges should be guardians of the
Constitution); STITES, supra note 2, at 92 (citing Marshall's statement at Virginia
Ratifying Convention).
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Constitution. He carefully nurtured and strengthened the
Court's claim to be the peculiar guardian of the Constitution,
giving voice and effect to the people's permanent will. He strove
to preserve and enhance the judiciary's image as a tribunal that
impartially pronounced "law" and kept out of "politics."6 By the
end of his tenure, the Supreme Court's mystique was essentially
in place. The justices were revered as Olympian sages, as jealous
protectors of the Constitution who are elevated above the
turbulent waters of politics. This mystique remains the basis of
the Court's extraordinary power and largely explains why an
institution composed of unelected judges with lifetime
appointments can credibly claim to serve the ends of democratic
government. 7
I. CAREER TO 1801
So, who was John Marshall and what were the political
principles and beliefs that informed his jurisprudence? First, let
me rapidly summarize his career to 1801.8 Before his judicial
appointment, Marshall led a varied career as a soldier, state
legislator, lawyer, diplomat, member of Congress, and Secretary
of State.9 Born in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains of
6 See FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 201 (noting "[q]uestions in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and law, submitted to the political department, can never
be made in this court."); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 52 (finding that "the judiciary refused
to take jurisdiction over 'questions, in their nature political' and confined itself to deciding
upon legal rights of individuals" (citing Marbury v. Madison)).
7 See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FELIX FRANKFURTER,
JOHN MARSHALL AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 137 (The Univ. of Chic. Press 1967) (finding
that "Marshall's ideas, diffused in all sorts of ways, especially through the influence of the
legal profession, have become the presuppositions of our political institutions."); see also
W. MELVILLE JONES, CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL 94 (W. Melville
Jones ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1956) (stating Marshall is standard against whom all other
Chief Justices are compared). See generally ROBERT B. TURNSTALL, THE MARSHALL
READER: THE LIFE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL 218-35 (Erwin
C. Surrency ed., Oceana Publ'ng 1955) (discussing how Marshall's contribution to
fundamental judicial principle had lasting effect on development of American
government).
8 See generally JOHN R. CUNEO, JOHN MARSHALL: JUDICIAL STATESMAN 4-5
(McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1975) (summarizing events in Marshall's life before Revolutionary
war); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing Marshall's professional life from 1789 until
his judicial appointment twelve years later); AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN
MARSHALL 4 (John Stokes Adams ed., The Univ. of Mich. Press 1937) (recounting
Marshall's early years).
9 See CUNEO, supra note 8 (cataloguing Marshall's early career accomplishments);
HOBSON, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing Marshall's career from 1782 until his
appointment to U.S. Supreme Court); AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 4 (reviewing Marshall's early career).
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Virginia in 1755, he was the eldest of fifteen children of Thomas
Marshall, a planter and county leader, and Mary Randolph
Keith, a clergyman's daughter descended from one of Virginia's
first families. His early education took place at home under his
father's supervision. At age fourteen Marshall spent a year at an
academy in a neighboring county, which was followed by a year
of study at home with the local parish priest. These two years of
formal schooling provided him the rudiments of a classical
education. Equally invaluable was the youth's exposure to the
informal "curriculum" of the colonial Virginia gentry, an
unexcelled practical school for future American statesmen. 10
Although fated for a career in law, at the onset of the War of
Independence in 1775 Marshall put aside his reading of
Blackstone's Commentaries and took up arms. He eventually
obtained a commission as an officer in the Continental army,
rising to the rank of captain. He saw action at Brandywine
Creek, Germantown, Monmouth, and Stony Point and survived
the winter's encampment at Valley Forge in 1777-1778. On
temporary leave from the army, Marshall in 1780 attended a
course of law lectures by George Wythe at the College of William
and Mary. Wythe's lectures constituted the future Chief Justice's
only formal law study and supplemented his self-education,
which began before and certainly continued after his brief college
sojourn.11
Marshall commenced his law career in earnest after moving
permanently to Richmond in 1784. He rapidly ascended the
professional ladder, distinguishing himself among the small
fraternity of lawyers who practiced in the state superior courts.
During the 1780s and 1790s he served periodically in the state
legislature. He was a delegate to the state ratifying convention
of June 1788, where he made a notable speech defending the
judiciary article of the Constitution. After the new government
began operation in 1789, Marshall repeatedly declined offers to
10 See CUNEO, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that at age 14 Marshall was sent 100 miles
from home to study at boarding school run by Scotch clergymen); HOBSON, supra note 5,
at 2 (delineating Marshall's education); AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 4 (reviewing Marshall's early education).
I I See CUNEO, supra note 8, at 16 (stating Marshall attended lectures at William and
Mary College from George Wythe); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that "the term at
William and Mary constituted Marshall's only formal study of law."); AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 5-6 (stating that he
attended these lectures).
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run for Congress or to accept a federal appointment, not yet
ready to give up a lucrative law practice that had now expanded
to include the federal circuit court. 12
As divisions over financial and foreign policy gave birth to an
opposition party led by Thomas Jefferson, Marshall, who
continued to serve in the state legislature, emerged as the
leading defender of the Washington administration. In effect, he
became the unofficial leader of the Federalist Party in Virginia,
gaining national attention for his public role in defending the
government's policies. Eventually, in 1797, President John
Adams prevailed upon Marshall to accept an appointment to a
diplomatic commission to France. The mission failed, but the
publication of his dispatches reporting the commissioner's refusal
to compromise American sovereignty and independence won him
national acclaim. Back home, Marshall was elected to Congress,
where he distinguished himself as a formidable spokesman for
the Adams administration. In May 1800, Adams brought the
Virginian into his cabinet as Secretary of State, the post he held
when nominated Chief Justice eight months later.13
Marshall was a happy choice to fill the highest judicial office in
the land. First, he was a technically sound lawyer, having
practiced for nearly twenty years in the higher courts of Virginia
and in the federal court. Second, he was a statesman of broad
experience. The knowledge and understanding gained through
participation in government were no less essential than lawyerly
skills as preparation for his role on the Supreme Court. Marshall
came to the bench thoroughly versed in the political processes
and workings of the federal and state governments, and he
understood as well as anyone the nature and boundaries of
legislative, executive, and judicial power. Intermittent, though it
was prior to 1801, Marshall's participation in public life occurred
at times and places that in retrospect appear to have been nicely
12 See CUNEO, supra note 8, at 49 (stating that monetary considerations precluded
Marshall from accepting public office); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that "[h]e could
not yet afford to give up his lucrative law practice."); AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 20-21 (explaining choice of private practice over public
service).
13 See CUNEO, supra note 8, at 50-56, 67-76 (providing detailed description of
Marshall's trip to France and what happened to him there); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 7
(providing concise explanation of events leading up to Marshall's nomination as Chief
Justice); AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 21-30
(providing autobiographical account of these events).
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calculated to prepare him for his high judicial station. For
example, he gained invaluable experience in constitutional
dialectics by participating in the debates at the Virginia ratifying
convention of 1788, by defending the Jay Treaty as a member of
the Virginia legislature in 1795, by arguing the celebrated
British debts case of Ware v. Hylton 4 in the Supreme Court in
1796, and, lastly, by his masterly defense of the Adams
administration's extradition of Jonathan Robbins in 1800.
Indeed, it was for this great forensic effort that Adams rewarded
Marshall with a place in his cabinet. In appointing Marshall to
be Chief Justice, Adams knew he had found the right man for the
job, but perhaps in 1801 he did not know just how excellent his
choice was. In 1825, shortly before his death, he wrote that it
was "the pride of my life that I have given to this nation a Chief
Justice equal to Coke or Hale, Holt or Mansfield."'15
II. MARSHALL AS REPUBLICAN
Marshall was forty-five when he took his seat on the Supreme
Court. During the preceding two decades he had formulated the
views on politics and government that he was to hold essentially
unchanged for the rest of his life. As a child of the American
Revolution, he embraced classical republicanism as modified by
its accommodation to the "modern" world of the eighteenth
century.16  He was a votary of "republican" or "popular"
government, that is, government that was elective and
representative and in which the right to vote belonged to white
male landowners. 17 Such a government depended on "virtue,"
14 3 U.S. 199, 199(1796).
15 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN MARSHALL, AUG. 17,
1825 197 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 2000); see also ALLAN B. MAcGRUDER, AMERICAN
STATESMAN: JOHN MARSHALL 163 (John T. Morse, Jr. ed., Houghton, Mifflin and Co.
1897) (1885) (stating Adams decision was based on "an instinctive perception of a peculiar
fitness for the place" ); STITES, supra note 2, at 79 (stating that 25 years later, Adams
considered Marshall's appointment as "gift" to American people and proudest moment of
his life).
16 See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64-71 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1913)
(explaining freehold requirements established in each of 13 colonies); FAULKNER, supra
note 2, at 117-24 (explaining freehold requirement in terms of Lockean political theory);
HOBSON, supra note 5, at 16-25 (explaining Marshall's understanding of Republicanism).
17 See FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 122-23 (associating republican principles with
representation based on property rights); HOBSON, supra note 5, at 16-17 (explaining that
"[plopular government was elective and representative government, in which the right to
vote belonged to white male 'freeholders,' defined in his own state of Virginia as those
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now recently redefined to accord more with the realities of
human nature and better adapted to the rise of commerce and
the market.18 It recognized and to some extent gave free play to
man's passions and interests.19 Like others of his generation,
Marshall was able to reconcile republicanism with the spirit of
commerce, a belief in the philosophy of individual rights, and a
recognition of self-interest as a legitimate motive in human
affairs. 20 Still, he remained firmly wedded to classical republican
values. 21  The idea that society was nothing more than a
collection of completely self-absorbed individuals and groups and
that politics was an arena of scrambling selfish interests was
abhorrent to Marshall, 22 as it was to the founders generally.23 He
was typically republican in his distaste for party politics, which,
he said, tended "to abolish all distinction between virtue and
vice;24 and to prostrate those barriers which the wise and good
have erected for the protection of morals, and which are defended
solely by opinion."25 Federalist spokesman though he was in the
owning a one-quarter-acre town lot or twenty-five acres and a dwelling house in the
country, or fifty acres of unimproved land."). See generally BEARD, supra note 16, at 69
(explaining Virginia qualifications for voting).
18 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 18; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 37-39
(discussing Marshall's respect for industry and how he followed Montesquieu's view of
commercial republicanism).
19 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 18; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 117
(discussing Marshall and Madison's definition of republic as "administered.. .according
to the public will...").
20 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 18-19; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 37
(emphasizing Marshall's praise of industry, wealth, power and dedication leading to peace
and improvement of man).
21 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 19; see also LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL - A
LIFE IN LAW 38 (Macmillan Publ'g 1974) (defining Marshall's idea of republic as
responsive to those it represents and based on fair set of laws).
22 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 19; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 92 (quoting
Marshall, who questioned whether some powerful men had objectives other than America
retaining its independence); DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE'S PROGRESS - JOHN
MIARSHALL FROM REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SuPREME COURT 99 (Greenwood Press
2000) (explaining Marshall's fears of violent dissentions in state, as well as politicians
who promote their own private dishonesty, harming prospect of free America).
23 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 17; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 111 (discussing
Washington's view that United States' success depended on unity among Americans
"which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and politics"); ROBARGE, supra
note 22, at 209 (describing founding fathers as enlightened and virtuous).
24 HOBSON, supra note 5, at 17; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 203 (explaining
Marshall's disgust for partisan politics); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL -
DEFINER OF A NATION 6 (Henry Holt and Co. 1996) (defiming Marshall as man driven by
patriotism, not partisanship).
25 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 2: 349 (2d ed. 1838); see also
SMITH, supra note 24, at 7-8 (describing how Marshall deplored vindictiveness of
campaigning).
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1790's, Marshall never regarded himself as a "party" man, but as
a defender of the Constitution, and established government
against unjustified attacks by partisan factions bent on some
selfish or sinister aim. 26  Marshall clung to the classical
republican conception that enlightened statesmen could identify
and pursue a single public interest even as he recognized that
competing and clashing interests were inevitable concomitants of
free and popular governments. 27 He continued to hold onto a
concept of virtue that in some measure required
disinterestedness, if not by the whole citizenry, then at least by
the leadership of the republic.28 He believed that virtue, fortified
by proper constitutional arrangements, could continue to be the
animating principle of the American republic. 29 His attachment
to the Constitution was based in no small part on the hope that it
would preserve and strengthen the career of republican virtue in
a society that was becoming increasingly less homogeneous, more
factious, and more driven by the imperatives of the market.
Revolutionary republicanism shaped Marshall's political creed
and his constitutional jurisprudence. 30 From his experiences as a
Continental soldier and postwar Virginia legislator 31 sprang a
conviction that the Constitution of 1787 marked a decisive
turning point away from a union of confederated states toward a
26 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 17; see also DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE - JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REPUBLIC 335 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1949) (stating
that Marshall's aloofness toward slavery was but one example of his "general abstention
from politics); SMITH, supra note 24, at 6-7 (describing Marshall's bond to patriotism, not
particular political party).
27 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 17; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 125-26
(stating that Marshall believed ideal statesmen possessed such virtues as discipline and
sense of justice).
28 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 19, 24; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 117
(describing Marshall's view that only through virtue can nation be republican); ROBARGE,
supra note 22, at 41 (describing Marshall's insistence on virtuous men running
government).
29 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 22; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 94 (explaining
how Marshall's desire for strong central government developed in his years as a soldier);
LOTH, supra note 26, at 43 (describing how great deal of Marshall's future politics was
developed during his combat experience).
30 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 101
(describing how members of Constitutional Convention wanted to enlarge powers of
federal government); SMITH, supra note 24, at 111 (citing invitation Marshall received to
Constitutional Convention to make central government stronger by revising Articles of
Confederation).
31 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 106 (describing
how Articles of Confederation rested on voluntarism that was impossible to enforce).
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"nation of states" based on the principle of national supremacy.32
Any attempt to construe the Constitution into a compact
resembling the discarded Articles of Confederation was an
interpretative heresy that must be combated with all the
weapons at his command. 33 Nationalism arose naturally from
resistance to Great Britain; and his association in the
Continental army "with brave men from different states who
were risking life and everything valuable in a common cause"
confirmed him "in the habit of considering America as my
country, and congress as my government." 34 Marshall's partiality
to union and nationalism hardened into an unwavering
conviction during the 1780's, as the return of peace exposed the
dangerous weaknesses of a Confederation government that
lacked the power to tax or to impose a uniform commercial
policy. 35 He was never an advocate of national power for its own
sake, however, but only as a means to preserve and consolidate
the newly won independence of the United States and to promote
the commercial prosperity of the American people.3 6  The
impotent Confederation portended political and commercial
anarchy, disunion, and eventual loss of independence, as the
individual American states would inevitably become subservient
to European powers.3 7
At the core of Marshall's nationalist outlook was a deep-rooted
anxiety about the perilous position of the United States in a
hostile world. That American security, independence, and
32 AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 9-10.
33 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 96 (describing
how, even in emergency, states were not likely to obey tax put on them by national
government); ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 98 (describing how Confederation had no power
to raise revenue, regulate commerce or defend nation from invaders).
34 HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 38 (describing
how Marshall's war experience led him to believe that strong national government was
crucial for continued independence); SMITH, supra note 24, at 12 (describing Marshall's
view that strong national government was key to survival of nation).
35 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 79 (describing
how commerce was suffering from rivalries between states); SMITH, supra note 24, at 8
(describing how Marshall was one of supporters of Constitution as guard against what
was becoming anarchy in states).
36 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 98-99 (stating
that Federalists believed that absence of strong central government would allow Spanish,
British and Indians to stop union's manifest destiny). Cf SMITH, supra note 24, at 118
(quoting Washington, stating that "[A] weak state with Indians on it's back and Spaniards
on it's flank [must] see the necessity of a General Government. .. ").
37 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also SMITH, supra note 24, at 115 (describing
Marshall's belief that national unity was crucial to survival of United States and
continued independence).
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ultimately, American liberty, required a strong and energetic
general government was an axiom Marshall never doubted, and
he operated on the assumption that the Constitution conferred
the requisite powers to accomplish these objects. 38 Throughout
his life, Marshall viewed the federal government as chronically
vulnerable to the aggressive encroachments of the state
governments. 39 These internal pressures that undermined the
authority of the central government and loosened the bonds of
union in turn exposed the United States to external threats-
inviting intervention, even invasion, by foreign powers. 40 In the
American federal system as he understood it, centrifugal force
was much stronger than centripetal. 41 If the republic was to
perish, it would not be "by the overwhelming power of the
National Government, but by the resisting and counteracting
power of the State sovereignties."42 The Constitution, he believed,
was designed to establish equilibrium between the federal and
state governments, an equilibrium that was in constant danger of
breaking down in the direction of the states.43 Marshall's
nationalism might properly be described as defensive or
negative-resisting the superior force of state sovereignty rather
than augmenting federal power.
As a state legislator in the 1780's, where he followed the lead of
James Madison, Marshall came to see that the objects of an
invigorated national government went beyond enhancing
38 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 79 (describing
how whole country was at mercy of bickering states in area of commerce); SMITH, supra
note 24, at 17 (quoting Marshall, describing his fear Jefferson would try to strengthen
state rights at expense of federal government).
39 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 20-21; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 98
(describing how nation was vulnerable to foreign invasion); SMITH, supra note 24, at 103
(describing Marshall's fear that, if US did not repay its debts to England, they were likely
to be attacked).
40 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 101 (stating
that nationalists were in favor of enlarging power of federal government).
41 Joseph Story, A Discourse upon the Life, Character, and Services of the Honorable
John Marshall, in JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER, AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 3:368
(John F. Dillon ed., 1903)
42 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 105
(describing Marshall's fear that states would grow in power and conflicts between states
would get worse); ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 98 (stating how Virginia and other states
were gaining more power and harming federal government by passing paper money and
hurting individual property rights).
43 HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 111 (describing
Washington's idea that stronger federal government was crucial to survival of United
States); LOTH, supra note 26, at 79 (describing attempts to reform commerce to alleviate
rivalries between states).
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security and promoting greater commercial prosperity, important
as these were.4 4 Such a government would also promote internal
tranquility within the states, where the danger to liberty was
perhaps more immediately threatening than that posed by
external forces. 45 The source of this danger was the American
people themselves, a circumstance that cast grave doubts on the
long-term prospects for their novel experiment in republican
self-government. 46 Madison, indeed, concluded on the eve of the
Federal Convention that the fundamental crisis facing America
was the apparent failure of republican government as practiced
in the states.47  Laws enacted by state legislatures far too
frequently reflected the selfish interests of popular majorities
and trampled upon the private rights of individuals and
minorities. 48 Marshall, too, directly witnessed the declining
influence of the "wise and virtuous," whose efforts to observe
public faith and honor were increasingly challenged by the
schemes of self-interested majorities. Debtors and land
speculators, for example, formed the core of an increasingly
numerous faction that was gaining ascendancy in the legislature,
where under the guise of public law they could mitigate the
consequences of private folly. 4 9
Without question, the turbulent and corrupt politics of the
postwar years, the disorderly tumults that portended civil
anarchy and social chaos made an indelible impression upon the
44 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 111 (describing
Washington's idea that stronger federal government was crucial to survival of United
States); LOTH, supra note 26, at 79 (describing attempts to reform commerce to alleviate
rivalries between states).
45 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 99 (stating
Marshall's fear that uprisings such as Shay's Rebellion, and inability of national
government to combat them, was major problem for Confederation).
46 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also LOTH, supra note 26, at 34 (stating that
way Continental Congress governed was chaotic); ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 101 (stating
Marshall's idea that relaxation of laws by states needed to be stopped).
47 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 21; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 77
(describing how, even later in his life, Marshall, being private citizen experienced
.opposition from selfish individuals"); SMITH, supra note 24, at 93 (quoting Marshall,
stating that pettiness of self-interests distract Counsel members from their real tasks).
48 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 22; see also SMITH, supra note 24, at 111, 115
(discussing Marshall's concern that state legislatures were catering to needs of debtors).
49 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 23; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 100 (stating
Marshall's fear that uprisings in Massachusetts would spread throughout New England
and south); SMITH, supra note 24, at 110 (describing Marshall's disdain at turbulence
done in name of people).
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mind of the future chief justice.50 Marshall embraced a chastened
and sober republicanism that favored a "well regulated
Democracy" as embodied in the Constitution, that is, popular
government in which there would be "a strict observance of
justice and public faith, and a steady adherence to virtue."51
Marshall believed that republican government could still work
tolerably well, so long as it operated within a system of checks
and balances that reinforced the natural moderating effects of
self-interest 52 and produced leaders of excellent character,
distinguished for sound and discriminating judgment and
disinterested attachment to the public interest.53 In revising his
thinking about republican government, Marshall, like Madison
and others, called into question the heretofore superior role
enjoyed by legislatures, where much of the obnoxious behavior
from which he recoiled in disgust was occurring. 54 His own direct
experience with the mischievous, selfish politics of the 1780's left
him deeply skeptical of popular assemblies and led him to reflect
on the potential role of the judiciary in maintaining a "well
regulated Democracy."55 With the decline of the legislatures into
arenas of licentiousness, courts and judges became increasingly
looked upon as repositories of virtue and wisdom, where reason,
reflection, judgment, and disinterestedness continued to hold
sway. 56
50 See John Marshall, Speech in the Virginia Ratiying Convention, June 10, 1788 in
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, VOL. 1 256 (Herbert A. Johnson, et al. eds., 1974).
51 HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 113 (describing
Marshall's view that balancing of power is essential for Constitution to work); SMITH,
supra note 24, at 132 (quoting Marshall's speech before Virginia Constitutional
Convention, which detailed virtues of separation of powers).
52 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 107-08 (quoting
Marshall, describing how government must be run "by men exempt from passions
incident to human nature"); LOTH, supra note 26, at 104 (describing Marshall's hope that
judiciary would be run by able and honest men).
53 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 101 (noting
Marshall was able to discern "imbecility of the nation" and danger young states face if not
held together by cement); SMITH, supra note 24, at 115 (stating that in light of excessive
power of state legislature, Marshall highly valued article in Constitution which imposed
restrictions on states).
54 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 364 (asserting
that from moment Marshall became Chief Justice, he aimed to strengthen role of
Supreme Court, using law to solve political problems); SMITH, supra note 24, at 116
(explaining Marshall's view that strong judiciary was essential to individual liberties).
55 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 200
(revealing Marshall's belief that "the judiciary's role was first in dignity and authority,
and it was to determine the principles to be guarded").
56 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 106-107
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From this period, as well, dates Marshall's lifelong distrust of
the state governments and his belief that one of the chief
advantages of a reformed and strengthened national government
was its capacity to act as a steadying counterweight to those
smaller republics. 57 The "general tendency of state politics" had
convinced him that "a more efficient and better organized general
government" provided the only "safe anchorage ground."58 In his
opinion the most valuable provision of the new Constitution was
the restrictions placed upon the states, particularly the
restriction prohibiting the states from enacting laws "impairing
the Obligation of Contracts."59 Marshall's later expositions of the
Constitution's contract clause were infused with perceptions
formed during the post-Revolutionary era.60 Time and again he
recited the evils arising from the state politics of the 1780's,
whose vicious and alarming tendency was "not only to impair
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but
to sap the morals of the people and destroy the sanctity of private
faith."61 To remedy these mischiefs was a paramount goal of "all
the truly wise, as well as the virtuous" and "one of the important
benefits expected from a reform of the government."62 In the
hands of Chief Justice Marshall and his "wise and virtuous"
brethren, the contract clause emerged as a potent constitutional
remedy for preserving the health of the American republic.
(assessing Marshall's characterization of state's power was phrased in the negative).
57 See AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 10.
58 HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 119 (revealing that
part of Constitution, which imposed restrictions on states most appeals to Madison);
SMTrH, supra note 24, at 110 (suggesting in Marshall's opinion that one of nation's largest
problems was "lax notions" states had toward contract obligations).
59 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24; see also ROBARGE, supra note 22, at 77
(describing Marshall's concern for those who opposed movement to compel strict
compliance with contracts); SMITH, supra note 24, at 116 (demonstrating that Marshall
according to holding of many cases was firmly on side of contract compliance).
60 See HOBSON, supra note 5, at 24-25.
61 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 355 (1827).
62 Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 792-93 (1999); see also
Brannon P. Denning, Book Review: Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of
Judicial Review. By William E. Nelson, 93 LAw LIBR. J. 345, 345 (2001) (describing
author's assessment of judicial review as "tentative in appearance" on American Stage
prior to Marbury); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WiS. L. REV.
941, 978 (1990) (stating that idea of judicial review gained force from 1780s onward);
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHu. L. REV. 1127, 1129
(1987) (commenting how new states translated "English opposition rhetoric" into action
with early instances of judicial intervention of legislative acts).
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III. JUDICIAL POWER
I want to devote my remaining time to examining the ideas
about judicial power and the role of the judiciary in the American
system of government that Marshall was exposed to in the years
preceding his appointment. Although his first years in office
were marked by conflict with the Jefferson administration, the
larger truth is that Marshall arrived at the chief justiceship at an
auspicious moment for the institution of the judiciary. The last
two decades of the eighteenth century witnessed what historian
Gordon Wood has called "a massive rethinking that eventually
transformed the position of the judiciary in American life," and "a
remarkable transformation," all the more so because it took place
in a relatively brief time and "flew in the face of much
conventional eighteenth-century popular wisdom." Most
Americans in 1776 lacked a concept of an independent judiciary.
Even though they divided government into legislative, executive,
and judicial branches, separation of powers really meant
separation of legislative and executive power. The
administration of justice was still regarded as part of the
executive or magisterial power. Indeed, during the colonial
period, judges had been an extension of royal authority,
completely identified with the royal governors. Judges were
viewed with mistrust not only because of their connection with
the governors, but also because they exercised broad
discretionary power in interpreting the multiple and confusing
sources of colonial law.6 3 So, against this background of mistrust,
how did the judicial power carve out a separate identity as one of
the three constitutional powers of government; how did judges
acquire a role in republican government as the paramount
interpreters of the laws and as guardians of the rights of
individuals; and how did unelected judges with life tenure
ultimately presume to disallow laws enacted by popularly elected
legislatures?
We now have a clearer understanding that the enhanced status
63 See Wood, supra note 62, at 792-93; see also Denning, supra note 62, at 345
(describing author's assessment of judicial review as "tentative in appearance" on
American Stage prior to Marbury); Riggs, supra note 62, at 978 (stating that idea of
judicial review gained force from 1780s onward); Sherry, supra note 62, at 1129
(commenting how new states translated "English opposition rhetoric" into action with
early instances of judicial intervention of legislative acts).
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of judicial power was a trans-Atlantic phenomenon, a reaction to
the tremendous upsurge in legislation issued forth from
representative assemblies in Great Britain and, after the onset of
the Revolution, in America.64 No longer simply checks on an
aggrandizing executive, representative assemblies had become
institutions whose chief activity was the enactment of positive
legislation to meet the demands of a modernizing society. In
England, the swelling parliamentary statute book produced a
sustained critique of legislation riddled with gross defects and
inconsistencies and brought about a corresponding new respect
for judicial interpretation as a means of rationalizing and
reconciling legislation to accord with the principles of common
law and equity. 65 Even in Great Britain, whose constitutional
system recognized the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
there was plenty of room for a robust conception of judicial
power, as evidenced by the career of Lord Mansfield, the great
Chief Judge of the Court of Kings' Bench.
64 See Jack N. Rakove, The Critical Use of History: The Origins of Judicial Review: A
Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1054-56 (1997) (stating that there is
general agreement that 181h Century brought dramatic upsurge in impulse to legislate).
See generally Steven Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1128 (1994) (noting that
between Revolution and drafting Federal Constitution, several state courts had made
tentative moves toward asserting power of judicial review over legislation); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993 (2001) (addressing how
distrust of legislative bodies caused receptive opinions towards judicial review and
equitable construction of statutes to protect liberty); Rodolphe J.A. de Seife, The King is
Dead! The Court-Created American Concept of Immunity: The Negation of Equality and
Accountability underLaw, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 981, 1067 n.18 (1996) (discussing birth of
American concept of judicial review when attempt was made to rule act of Parliament
unconstitutional).
65 Cf Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 896 (1994) (noting English precedent as
relevant because with comparatively less power than Congress, English Commonshad
successfully deployed power of purse as device to curb dictatorial tendencies of their
monarchs); Joshua Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation ofFederalPower, and
the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 281 n.100 (1997) (stating that United States
rejected English concept of Parliamentary sovereignty thus creating American legislative
sovereignty in way more closely analogous to corporate charters and subjecting it to
concept that government was "bounded by terms of delegation" of power derived from
consent of governed). See generally DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION
DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 124 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989) (stating that this conception of common law appears also to have informed
Chief Justice often critical attitude to Parliament Legislation); Nestor M. Davidson,
Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the Human Radiation Experiments,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1251 n.72 (1996) (fmdint that "the Constitution reflected a
conscious decision to reject English conception of sovereignty as King-in-Parliament, and
was instead modeled on the corporate examples of the early colonial compacts and state
constitutions.").
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The same forces were at work in post-Revolutionary America,
when many came to perceive the advantages of a knowledgeable
and professionally-trained judiciary in bringing order and
stability to the republican experiment in government that at
times threatened to careen out of control. Madison, for example,
recognized more quickly than anyone else that the turbulent,
faction-ridden, interested politics that characterized the state
legislatures was ill-suited to the task of making good laws.
Although he never conceived of and never fully endorsed the
concept of judicial review, Madison did envision an enlarged role
for the judiciary in helping to ensure that popular government
would also be stable and just. He preferred to have wise and
good laws framed at the outset by associating the judiciary with
the executive as a "council of revision" over pending legislation.
In this way the judiciary would give the legislature "valuable
assistance... in preserving a consistency, conciseness,
perspicuity [and] technical propriety in the laws" and would
provide "an additional check" against "unwise [and] unjust
legislation."66 Even without judicial review, it is clear that
American judges, like their English counterparts, would play a
significant role in controlling legislative excesses and abuses
simply by exercising their ordinary adjudicative power or
possibly by having a role in the legislative process itself.
In America, judicial discretion was assimilated to
republicanism, contrary to what Thomas Jefferson, the great
republican revolutionary and lawgiver, had in mind in
formulating his reform plans for Virginia. Jefferson, who
detested Lord Mansfield to the same degree that Marshall
admired him, believed that it was possible to maintain a system
of laws founded in reason and equity without resorting to judicial
discretion. He proposed a comprehensive reform that aimed not
only to purge the laws of all monarchical features but also to
reduce much of common law and equity to statute. He
envisioned a code of laws "adopted to our republican form of
government . . . with a single eye to reason, and the good of
those for whose government it was framed." This republican code
would be rational, clearly understood, and easily applied. Deeply
66 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 74 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1966) (1918) (quoting James Madison's Speech at Federal Convention (July
21, 1787)).
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distrustful of discretionary judicial power, Jefferson frankly
admitted that his goal was to confine judges to the strict letter of
the law. "Let mercy be the character of the law-giver," he wrote
in 1776, "but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the
law will be dispensed equally and impartially to every
description of men; those of the judge, or of the executive power
will be the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing
man. "
67
But the Virginia legislature, as Madison and Marshall soon
discovered, confounded Jefferson's hopes. His vision of a
republican political order with a system of laws founded on
precise legislative enactment, to be mechanically applied by
judges bound by the strict letter of the law, never materialized.
Because of confusing, contradictory, and most disturbingly, a
growing number of unjust laws enacted by the legislature,
judicial discretion became even more necessary than it had been
under the colonial regime. To the traditional task of applying
English common law and equity was added that of construing the
positive laws of the commonwealth. Each year brought a harvest
of new laws requiring ever increasing adjudications. Virginians
got used to the idea that their courts were necessary to prevent
or ameliorate mischiefs arising from the laws. The emerging
distinction between "legislative will" and "justice," the growing
perception that statutory law was not necessarily reasonable and
just, became the foundation of a conception of judicial
independence and discretion that was consistent with the
republican belief in popular sovereignty. Virginians came to
accept the notion, which their judges consciously fostered, that
judicial discretion in the interpretation of laws was not the
exercise of the arbitrary and capricious will of the judge, but in
the deepest sense, giving effect to the will of the law. With the
disparagement of legislative power, a consequence of the volatile
politics of the 1780's, the assemblies lost their status as the sole
repositories of the people's will. At the same time there was a
corresponding enhancement of both executive and judicial power.
In brief, there was a redefinition of the separation of powers, in
which executives and judges, even though unelected, gained a
67 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 1950) (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776)).
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kind of equivalent standing with legislators as representatives or
agents of the sovereign people.
As a lawyer in post-Revolutionary Virginia, Marshall was
directly exposed to this transformation of the judiciary, to this
renewed flourishing of judicial discretion, which was increasingly
accepted not only as compatible with republican government but
as necessary to its preservation.6 8 As a practitioner in the courts
of Edmund Pendleton, president of the Court of Appeals, and of
George Wythe, chancellor of the High Court of Chancery,
Marshall was enrolled in the best of schools for judges. The most
important lesson these eminent jurists imparted to the future
chief justice was that judges in the ordinary course of deciding
cases had broad discretion to determine what the law was,
compelled as they were to choose from a variety of sources:
English common law, Parliamentary statutes, acts of colonial and
state legislatures, and a growing body of state common law
emerging from adjudicated cases in the state courts. The
opinions and decrees of Pendleton and Wythe breathed a spirit of
vigorous independence, even in the most mundane cases, and
furnished lawyer Marshall with countless practical lessons in
judging. The routine function of applying the common law
frequently involved the exercise of discretion in cases that called
for adjusting the law to fit Virginia circumstances, in cases that
depended on the construction of a testator's will, and in cases
that hinged on the explication of a statute. No judge better
epitomized the independent-minded jurist than did Chancellor
Wythe. Whether upholding the rights of British creditors or
interpreting the will of a Quaker to give the broadest possible
scope to the testator's intention of manumitting his slaves,
Wythe was fearless in the performance of his duty of meting out
discretionary justice.69
68 See generally HOBSON, supra note 5, at 39-46; Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 64,
at 1128 (stating that between Revolution and drafting of Federal Constitution, several
state courts had made tentative moves toward assertion of power of judicial review over
legislation); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"ii n Modern American Constitutionaism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 571 (1995) (noting judicial review, too, would safeguard deliberation
by protecting considered judgments of populace, embodied in constitutional law, against
transitory, ill-considered actions of public officials); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
167, 195 (quoting Marshall's dictum, stated years later, whereby he asserted, "It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
69 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law
Teaching in a Democracy, 1991 DUKE L.J. 741, 768 (1992) (keeping with Revolutionary
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But the instruction of Pendleton and Wythe extended further
to embrace the role of law and courts in the larger scheme of
republican government. In Virginia, the concept of an
independent judiciary took root quickly and flourished in
congenial soil. As early as 1782, the Virginia Court of Appeals
heard a case involving a seeming conflict between the state
constitution and a statute concerning treason. Although in this
instance the judges were able to reconcile law and constitution,
the occasion brought forth an eloquent statement from
Chancellor Wythe on the duty of a judge "to point to the
constitution" and say to an overreaching legislature, "Here is the
limit of your authority; and hither, shall you go, but no further."70
Wythe's dicta revealed how fully he had moved beyond a narrow
conception of judicial duty to embrace the idea of the judiciary as
an impartial umpire between government and citizen and
between different departments of government. 71 In 1788, the
Court of Appeals publicly protested against an act that would
have required them to ride circuit, claiming that it assigned new
duties without a commensurate increase in pay and thus
undermined the principle of judicial independence.7 2 Again, a
crisis was averted because the legislature repealed the offending
law. This episode was a clear indication that Virginia judges
regarded judicial independence as a constitutional principle that
legislatures in drafting legislation affecting the judiciary were
bound to respect. A few years later the legislature enacted a law
giving common law district judges the power to issue injunctions
and hear suits by injunction. This time the judges actually
generation's thoughts of emancipating slaves, Wythe freed his slaves in 1782 when it
became permissible in Virginia); Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhortation
from the Spirit of the Hon. Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 705, 737-38 (1992) (stating that according to Wythe and other law teachers
of his generation, political studies ought to be great object with general youth of republic,
not for sake of place or profit, but for sake of judging right and preserving constitution
inviolate); A. Leon Higginbotham et al., DeJuree Housing Segregation in the United
States and South Africa, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 877 n.585 (1990) (noting that although
Virginia Supreme Court held otherwise, Chancellor George Wythe declared in lower court
decision in pre-Civil War case of Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. 134 (1806) that when one
person claimed to hold another in slavery, burden of proof always lay on claimant).
70 Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. 5, 8 (1782).
71 See id. at 17 (describing government divided into three branches with each
assigned its proper power and directing each to be kept separate and distinct).
72 See Case of the Judges of Court of Appeals, 1788 Va. LEXIS 3, 8 (1788)
(contending that it was contrary to Constitution to impose new duties to be preformed out
of courts to which judges respectively belonged).
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disallowed the law on the ground that it unconstitutionally
conferred chancery jurisdiction on common law judges. This
case, Kamper v. Hawkins,73 has some interesting parallels with
the case of Marbury v. Madison74 decided years later. In both
cases the laws brought under constitutional scrutiny were
judiciary acts, and on both occasions the judges denied the
additional jurisdiction conferred upon them by the legislature.
Without question, this transformation of the judiciary in post-
Revolutionary America, the consequence of a largely successful
campaign to persuade the American people that judicial
discretion was an essential means of ensuring that republican
government would be "a government of laws, and not of men,"75
was an indispensable prerequisite for the emergence of the
doctrine that courts in deciding cases were empowered to void
laws that infringed constitutions, what we today call "judicial
review." 76 This is a large topic that I have deliberately avoided
and haven intention of entering into on this occasion. My
concluding point is simply this: We cannot begin to understand
what judicial review meant to Marshall or to the framers
generally without reference to this broader, and somewhat
unexpected, development in which the judicial power became in
fact, as well as theory, one of the three constituent powers of
government.
73 3 Va. 20, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1788).
74 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
75 Id. at 163.
76 See id.
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